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Introduction 
Modern debates over secularization in the Christian west share a common 
understanding of the term: namely, that secularization refers to an epochal 
transformation in which a culture based in religious belief was transformed into one 
based in an autonomous human reason.1 The debating positions advanced with regard 
to this supposed transformation, however, are quite varied. They include celebratory 
accounts of the linear emancipation of reason from religion through philosophy and 
science;2 dialectical accounts that regard this emancipation as one that “translates” 
and preserves religious ideals within autonomous reason;3 and theological-historical 
accounts that treat the autotomizing of human reason as symptomatic of the triumph 
of a subterranean theology rather than its displacement, and hence as the prelude to a 
“post-secular” age.4 Rather than adopting a position within this field of debate, 
however, the present paper offers an account of the historical emergence of the 
conception of secularization that underpins it.  
In what follows I shall show that the umbrella conception of secularization as an 
epochal transition from religious belief to autonomous rationality did not emerge until 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. Here it functioned as a “combat concept” for 
an array of rival religious, philosophical, and political factions whose descendants 
continue to do battle in today’s arguments over secularization. The conception of 
secularization as an epochal shift from divine religious dependence to human rational 
autonomy can be characterized as philosophical-historical, in part because it relied on 
                                                
1  This paper was first presented to the “Narratives of Secularisation” conference, held 
by the Centre for the History of European Discourses (University of Queensland) at Prato in 
September 2013. I am grateful to the Centre for its support and to the conference participants 
for their comments. 
2  J. Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture: Religious 
Intolerance and Arguments for Religious Toleration in Early Modern and 'Early 
Enlightenment' Europe (Cambridge, 2006). J. I. Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: 
Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford, 2011).  
3  J. Habermas, “Glauben und Wissen,” Dialog 1 (2002), 63-74. J. Habermas, “‘The 
Political’: The Rational Meaning of a Questionable Inheritance of Political Theology,” in E. 
Mendieta and J. VanAntwerpen eds., The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (New York, 
2011), 15-33. P. E. Gordon, 'What Hope Remains?', New Republic, December 14, 2011.  
4  C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA, 2007). B. S. Gregory, The Unintended 
Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge Mass, 2012).  
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a central theme of a new kind of philosophical history — that history should be 
understood as the temporal unfolding of human rationality — and in part because it 
was elaborated by philosophers and theologians, rather than historians or jurists. In 
developing this discussion I shall be arguing not just that nobody in early modernity 
spoke of secularization in terms of a transition from divine reverencing to rational 
autonomy, but also that there is no evidence of such a transition taking place there 
and, further, that there is significant evidence to the contrary. The philosophical-
historical conception of secularization thus may be regarded as a distinctively modern 
coinage that has been anachronistically imposed on early modernity. 
In fact, I shall argue, the dominant sense of the noun “secularization” between 
1650 and 1800 was determined by its use in the discourse of public law to name the 
transfer of ecclesiastical territory and property into civil control and ownership.5 
Neither during this period was the adjective “secular” used to characterize a mentality 
oriented to rational autonomy. Rather, without losing its earlier meaning of “worldly” 
in opposition to “spiritual”, “secular” emerged as a synonym for “political” and 
“civil” in juridical-political discourses on new forms of government that eschewed the 
pursuit of spiritual ends in favor of the “political” (or “secular”) end of social peace. 
Despite their dominance and proximity, secular as a synonym for civil or political 
government thus only intersected fitfully and contingently with secularization as the 
civil conversion of ecclesiastical things. Crucially, neither usage relied upon an 
epochal shift of consciousness in the direction of rational autonomy, as is presumed in 
the modern philosophical-historical conception of secularization.6 
                                                
5  This difference between the public law and philosophical-historical usages of 
secularisation was clearly spelled out in the relevant entry in the Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe lexicon during the 1980s, as was the identification of the early 1800s as the 
point of emergence of the philosophical-historical meaning. See, Hans-Wolfgang Strätz and 
Hermann Zabel, ‘Säkularisation, Säkularisierung’, in O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. 
Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984), vol. 5, pp. 789-829. Unusually, but 
symptomatically, this entry consists of two separately authored essays, one dedicated to each 
of the usages, accompanied by the candid acknowledgment that the historical relation 
between them remains ‘contested’. 
6  Since the 1930s German scholarship has attempted to mark the difference between 
secularisation as the civil conversion of religious property and as epochal de-Christianization 
by using different terms for them: Säkularisation for the former and Säkularisierung for the 
latter. This of course is helpful for Germanophone scholars, yet even in German scholarship 
the terminological differentiation appears not to have helped solve the problem of the relation 
between the two phenomena. For an illuminating discussion of this set of issues, see Hartmut 
Lehmann, Säkularisierung: Der europäische Sonderweg in Sachen Religion (Göttingen: 
Wallstein Verlag, 2004), pp. 36-56.  
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It might be objected that, whether or not the term secularization was used in its 
philosophical-historical sense in early modernity, the process named by this sense — 
some sort of transition from an epoch of religious belief to one of rational autonomy 
— was indeed taking place at that time, which means that the debate over 
secularization retains its pertinence and gravity. The problem with this objection is 
that it assumes that the variant philosophical-historical conceptions of secularization 
— as rational emancipation from religious belief, conversion of confessional religion 
into moral philosophy, preservation of a hidden theology within an ostensibly secular 
rationality, and so on — are in fact attempts to describe a real historical process of 
some kind. I shall argue, though, that rather than treating them as historical accounts 
of seventeenth-century realities these conceptions should be understood as the 
instruments of a fractious nineteenth-century cultural politics. Here their role was not 
to provide falsifiable accounts of early modern historical transformations but to 
articulate rival programs for the ordering the current relations between church and 
state, and philosophy, theology, and law. 
The main point of this paper is thus not to show the historical falsity of the 
variant philosophical-historical conceptions of secularization but to provide an 
account of their historical emergence within a linked array of rival cultural-political 
programs, paying particular attention to early nineteenth-century Germany where this 
cultural politics assumed its most intense and consequential form. In developing this 
discussion I begin by characterizing some of the main modern philosophical-
historical conceptions of secularization, before providing an outline of the very 
different conceptions of secularization and the secular that obtained in early modern 
Germany. Only then do I offer an account of the particular cultural and political 
circumstances in early nineteenth-century Protestant Germany in which the modern 
philosophical-historical conception first emerged in its rival forms, before closing 
with some comments on their persistence in current debates. The central limitation of 
my account is that it is unfolded primarily within German religious, political and 
cultural history. This might be less of a limitation than it first seems, however, if, as I 
shall argue, all conceptions of secularization are in fact relative to particular regional 
intellectual contexts, and if the context of early nineteenth-century Germany proves to 
be central to the emergence of the modern conception of secularization. 
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Four Philosophical Histories of Secularization 
In identifying four main versions of the modern philosophical-historical 
conception of secularization I am attempting to provide neither an exhaustive 
taxonomy nor a theory of ideal types. My concern rather is to provide an indicative 
scan of the main conceptions of secularization as a transition to human rational 
autonomy, and to provide some initial sense of the historical contexts in which they 
appeared. 
The first such conception emerged from the broad tradition of “freethought” in 
the late eighteenth century.7 Centred in Britain and grounded in “rational dissent” — 
or Protestant rationalism’s combat with Trinitarian confessional Christianity — 
freethinking was a loose body of thought that nonetheless remained grounded in a 
distinctive intellectual style or “stance”.8 In the representative instance of Tom 
Paine’s The Age of Reason (1794-1807) this consisted of an anti-clerical mythography 
exposing Trinitarian Christianity as myth, a Unitarian or Socinian philosophical 
theology treating Jesus as a “virtuous and amiable” ethics teacher, and a deistic 
natural theology in which philosophical contemplation alone reveals the principles of 
the divinely ordered cosmos.9 Above all though it consisted in a Protestant practice of 
inner self-scrutiny whereby Paine alleged that the truth of all of these doctrines could 
be discovered through the inspection of his own individual conscience and 
consciousness, thereby indicating the particular art of thought or “spiritual exercise” 
that determined what counted as “universal reason” for freethinkers of this kind.10 
The dissenting political theology that constituted the prime content of this self-
culture of rational autonomy could be augmented by appealing to the natural sciences 
(as symptoms of the overcoming of religious superstition) and to democratic politics 
(as the exercise of free rational self-governance and rights), which permitted Paine’s 
Anglocentric form of freethought to ally with that of the French revolutionary 
philosophes and the religious rationalism of the American revolutionary statesmen. 
                                                
7  For an overview, see Edward Royle, Victorian Infidels: The Origins of the British 
Secularist Movement, 1791-1866 (Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1974).  
8  See, J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics 
During the Ancien Regime, 2nd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 385-95. 
Detailed studies can be found in Knud Haakonssen (ed.), Enlightenment and Religion: 
Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996).  
9  Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason, Part the First, Being and Investigation of True 
and Fabulous Theology, 4 vols. (London: R. Carlile, 1819), 4-30. 
10  Paine, The Age of Reason, 35-43. 
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This combined theological, political, and “naturalist” rationalism would find an early 
German champion in the figure of Carl Friedrich Bahrdt (1741-1792), and would be 
represented at the 1848 German National Assembly by the radical democratic 
naturalist Carl Vogt (1818-1895). Finally, the conception of secularization to which it 
gave rise — in which secularization is understood as the historical removal of the 
religious and political obstacles to a free and autarkic inner individual reasoning — 
was responsible for the first recorded English usage of secularization in the 
philosophical-historical sense, in William Lecky’s 1870 history of rationalism.11 In 
treating rationality as free, secular, and natural — and hence as necessarily supportive 
of democracy and science and corrosive of absolutism and religion — Jonathan 
Israel’s account of the inherently secularizing tendency of a Spinozist philosophical 
modernity may be regarded as a modified version of the freethought conception of 
secularization.12 
A second philosophical-historical conception of secularization would emerge 
from Immanuel Kant’s political and philosophical theology, in the context of fin de 
siècle German Protestant religious rationalism. Like the freethinkers, Kant also taught 
that philosophical and religious truth could be discovered through the individual’s 
inner rational inspection of the mind. His practice of inspection, though, hence his 
cultivation of “reason”, differed from theirs, in that it was supposed to uncover the 
(so-called) transcendental conditions of experience and the transcendent moral willing 
underlying empirical conscience.13 This permitted Kant to construct a philosophical 
                                                
11  The relation between Protestant religious rationalism and the freethought conception 
of secularisation is clear in Lecky’s comment that: 
[The Reformation] rejected an immense proportion of the dogmatic and 
ritualistic conceptions that had almost governed the whole field of religion, and 
rendered possible that steady movement by which theology has since then been 
gravitating towards the moral faculty. It, above all, diminished the prominence 
of the clergy, and thus prepared the way for that general secularisation of the 
European intellect, which is such a marked characteristic of modern 
civilisation. 
W. E. H. Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe, vol. 
1, 2 vols. (New York, 1866), 79. 
12  See, for example, Jonathan I. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the 
Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14-22, 59-81, 159-
76. For some recent versions of the freethought conception of secularisation, arguing that 
advances in philosophy and the natural sciences will inevitably break the “spell” or “delusion” 
of religion, see D. C. Dennettt, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon 
(London, 2006); and R. Dawkins, The God Delusion (London, 2006).  
13  For a rare appreciation of the metaphysical sources of Kant’s outlook in this regard, 
see Philip Merlan, Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness: Problems of the Soul in 
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theology and ecclesiastical history according to which the revealed biblical 
Christianity of the confessions — whose stories were accommodated to the immature 
“sensuous” form of man’s intellect — underwent a process of progressive historical 
purgation and refinement.14 This process relegated revealed ecclesiastical salvation in 
favor of the individual’s recovery of an inner rational capacity for moral regeneration 
and self-governance, in the form of Kant’s own moral philosophy.15  
Kant’s championing of a “pure religion of reason” formed part of the religious-
rationalist opposition to the Prussian religious constitution, which took the form of the 
legal recognition and state supervision of a plurality of revealed confessional 
religions.16 From Kant’s viewpoint this constitution represented an obstacle to the 
progressive rational supersession of historically revealed religions, even if from the 
constitutional viewpoint Kant’s philosophical theology represented an extra-ecclesial 
philosophical religion that was intent on undermining confessional pluralism through 
illicit proselytizing.17 Although Kant himself appears not to have used the term 
secularization (Säkularisierung, Verweltlichung), his model of philosophical history 
— as the historical emergence of rational self-governance through the progressive 
purification of revealed biblical religion — would come to support one of the major 
variants of the modern conception of secularization: namely, secularization as a 
progressive realization of man’s latent capacity for rational autonomy that preserves 
the latter’s transcendental character.18 
                                                                                                                                      
the Neoaristotelian and Neoplatonic Tradition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), pp. 114-
37. 
14  Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. W. S. Pluhar 
(Indianapolis IN: Hackett, 2009), pp. 113-37. 
15  Kant, Religion, pp. 66-87. 
16  On the structure and history of this constitution, see Martin Heckel, 
‘Religionsfreiheit: Ein säkulare Verfassungsgarantie’, in K. Schlaich (ed.), Martin Heckel, 
Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, vol. 4 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1997), 647-849.  
17  For more, see Walter Sparn, ‘Kant’s Doctrine of Atonement as a Theory of 
Subjectivity’, in P. J. Rossi and M. Wreen (eds.), Kant’s Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 103-12; and Ian Hunter, ‘Kant’s Religion and 
Prussian Religious Policy’, Modern Intellectual History 2 (2005), 1-27. The cultural and 
political clash between constitutionally entrenched confessional pluralism and university-
based “philosophical religions” also provides the context for another reception of Spinoza’s 
philosophical theology, during the course of the so-called Pantheismusstreit — the pantheism 
controversy — of the 1780s and 90s. For a collection of relevant documents, see Heinrich 
Scholz, (ed.), Die Hauptschriften zum Pantheismusstreit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn 
(Berlin: Reuther & Richard, 1916).  
18  Jürgen Habermas is the most significant modern exponent and defender of the 
Kantian conception of secularisation. See, in particular, Jürgen Habermas, “Glauben und 
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The third philosophical-historical conception of secularization arose from 
Hegelian philosophical theology, which in turn emerged from the same intra-
Protestant cultural-political clash — between revealed confessional and philosophical 
religion — that had defined the Kantian form.19 Hegel famously relegated Kant’s 
model of the progressive historical realization of individual rational autonomy in 
favor of a dialectical, leap-frogging progress through the successive forms of the 
“world spirit’s” historical self-manifestation. In treating each stage of historical self-
development as entailing both the destruction of a prior self-materialization of the 
world spirit and its simultaneous preservation in a new materialization, Hegel 
provided a philosophy of social institutions as the alienated or sublimated forms of 
man’s spiritual development, moving in an ascending series of stages from the family, 
through church and civil society, and culminating in the state.20 
From the splitting of this school of thought into two rival sects — during the 
political turbulence of the Vormärz (the period leading up to the March “revolution” 
of 1848) — there emerged two variant elaborations of Hegel’s philosophical history. 
On the one hand, adhering to the master’s conception of history as successive self-
manifestations of the world spirit, “right-Hegelians” followed Hegel himself in 
viewing both state and church as sublimated forms of originally Christian ideals and 
impulses. This permitted a rationalized (Protestant) Christianity to be regarded as the 
highest form of religion — as “absolute religion” — owing to its dialectical 
subsumption of earlier forms of (Catholic) sacramental religion and its progressive 
transformation of “religious feeling” into a self-conscious rational theology.21 It also 
permitted the state to be viewed as subsuming Christianity in a process through which 
the Christian idea of freedom was preserved in the sublimated form of a morally self-
                                                                                                                                      
Wissen”, where Habermas argues that Kant’s conception of rational autonomy both destroyed 
confessional religion yet preserved its critical dimension in the form of a transcendental 
critique of modernity.  
19  J. E. Toews, Hegelianism: The Path Toward Dialectical Humanism, 1805-1841 
(Cambridge, 1980), 141-55. 
20  Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. 
Sibree (London: Bohn, 1861), 56-82.  
21  Cf., ‘Spirit’s knowing of itself as it is implicitly is the being-in-and-for-self of spirit, 
the consummate, the absolute religion in which it is manifest what spirit is, what God is; and 
this religion is the Christian religion’. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion: One-Volume Edition, the Lectures of 1827, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. 
Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), p. 109. 
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conscious and spiritually awakened political state.22 On the other hand, in maintaining 
the model of dialectical self-development, but in supplanting the world spirit with 
anthropological or social forces as the animating principle, the “left-Hegelians” — led 
by Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, and Karl Marx — proposed that these forces 
impelled man to confront social institutions, the Christian churches in particular, as 
the alienated form of man’s inner feelings and social activity.23 From left- and right-
Hegelianism, then, there emerged two further variant philosophical-historical 
conceptions of secularization. According to one, ostensibly secular social institutions 
such as the state are in fact the sublimated form of Christian archetypes or ideals, 
such that the secularization of Christianity entails a reciprocal desecularization or 
sacralization of the state.24 According to the other, Christianity itself is the alienated 
form of human anthropology or sociology, making it possible to envisage its complete 
elimination through a radical secularization, now understood as revolutionary de-
alienation.25 
The final form of the philosophical-historical conception of secularization that 
we shall discuss emerged from a synthesis of Hegelian philosophical history and 
“transcendental” Thomist metaphysical theology, which was in fact a twentieth-
century development. On one side, this conception was grounded in a long-standing 
Thomist view of Protestantism (and Kantianism) as a theological deviation whose 
individual-subjective doctrine of conscience had turned away from the objective 
goods of (Aristotelian) virtue ethics, leading to a fracturing of the “sacramental” body 
and community — which is to say the church — in which they had been embedded.26 
On the other side, this conception was also grounded in the right-Hegelian view of 
apparently secular institutions as the sublimated form of religious ideas and impulses, 
                                                
22  Cf., ‘The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea — the ethical spirit as substantial 
will, manifest and clear to itself, which thinks and knows itself and implements what it knows 
in so far as it knows it’. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 
trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), §257, p. 275. 
23  See, for example, Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. M. Evans 
(London: Chapman, 1854), pp. 1-31.  
24  There are many variants of this conception of apparently secular institutions and 
forms of knowledge as secularised (sublimated) forms of Christian archetypes. Karl Löwith 
even applied this conception reflexively, to its own origins, treating philosophical history as a 
secularised form of Christian eschatology. See, K. Löwith, Meaning in History: The 
Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History (Chicago, 1949), 1-19. 
25  G. Stedman Jones, “Religion and the Origins of Socialism,” in I. Katznelson and G. 
Stedman Jones eds., Religion and the Political Imagination (2010), 170-89, at 185-87.  
26  The most well-known modern statement of this view is A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory, 2 ed. (Notre Dame, 1981).  
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in this case those of Reformation Protestantism. When combined, these two figures of 
thought make it possible to treat a whole array of institutions supposedly 
characteristic of our “secular age” — the natural sciences, empirical historiography, 
subjectivist ethics, the “disciplinary state” — as products of the sublimation of the 
Protestant religion, now understood as midwife to a desacramentalizing metaphysics 
that made the world available for objectification and instrumentalization.27 The most 
familiar recent elaboration of this synthetic Hegelian-Thomist conception of 
secularization is to be found in Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age, but the synthesis 
itself emerged as part of a major transition within Catholic theology and apologetics 
following World War II.28 In allowing the secular world to viewed as the sublimated 
form of Protestantism, Hegelian Thomism retrospectively locates the Reformation in 
yet another variant of philosophical history, this time one that opens the prospect of a 
future desublimation or desecularization and restoration of the sacramental order, as 
announced by the heralds of a “post-secular” age. 
With the partial exception of the last one, this whole array of philosophical-
historical conceptions of secularization appeared between 1800 and 1850, in the 
context of a series of religious and political conflicts associated with the 
rationalization of religion and the reordering of the role of confessional churches in 
rapidly transforming polities. If we consider the manner in which each of the four 
conceptions projects its own history of secularization — as the overcoming of 
religious belief through autonomous reason, the rational purification of revealed 
religion into transcendental rationality, the dialectical sublimation of Christianity into 
secular institutional forms (or the sublimation of anthropology and sociology into 
Christianity), or as the sublimation of Protestantism into an instrumentalized and 
subjectified social order — then it should already be clear that each of the histories is 
                                                
27  See Taylor, A Secular Age, 28-75, 96-99, 146-58. See also, Gregory, The Unintended 
Reformation, 36-64. 
28  For a powerful insider’s discussion of this transition, see Wayne John Hankey, 
‘Tradition and Development of Doctrine’, in D. A. Petley (ed.), Tradition: Received and 
Handed On (Charlottetown: St. Peter Publications, 1994), 16-52. Hankey identifies two 
factors in the change: first, the recovery of the neo-Platonic Dionysian dimension of 
Aquinas’s conception of being, giving rise to a “transcendental Thomism”; and second, the 
acknowledgement of Hegelian idealism as a “Christian philosophy” capable of overcoming 
the Protestant dissociation of subjectivity, nature, and history. Taken together, these 
developments made it possible for Catholic theology to conceive of truth as unfolding in time, 
and gave it a new enemy: the (somewhat oddly) combined forces of Heideggerian historicism 
and empirical biblical historiography, viewed as twin sources of historical discontinuity.  
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designed to advance a particular cultural-political program against its rivals.29 These 
included programs by secularists to supplant religion with science and philosophy; 
attempts by Protestant rationalists to convert confessional religion into a 
philosophical religion or moral philosophy; campaigns by “left-Hegelians” and 
Marxists to extirpate religion through revolutionary desublimation; and attempts by 
Catholic philosophical historians to undermine the autonomy of secular thought and 
institutions by treating them as the sublimated forms of a deviant (Protestant) 
theology, thereby killing two birds with one stone.  
If it is indeed the case that all philosophical-histories of secularization are in fact 
the instruments of rival cultural-political programs that emerged in the early 
nineteenth century, then we can excuse ourselves from direct participation in the 
vehement conflicts to which they have given rise. We can concentrate instead on 
providing an account of the historical emergence of the philosophical histories from 
these programs. The first step in this account is to show that prior to 1800 nobody 
talked about secularization as a process of the epochal replacement of confessional 
religion by human reason, because there was no such process to talk about or 
language in which to do so. We shall also show that while there indeed uses of the 
adjective “secular” to name domains from which theology or religion had been 
removed — especially the domain of public law and politics — these were not 
grounded in “secular reason” and formed an archipelago rather than a cosmos. 
“Secularization” in Early Modern Germany (c1650-c1800) 
We can begin by shifting the burden of proof. Focusing again on the modern 
philosophical-historical conception of secularization — as the long-term epochal or 
society-wide shift from divine dependence to human rational autonomy grounded in a 
new mentality or “social imaginary” — we must require those who assert its reality to 
provide evidence that the term was used in this way prior to the 1800s. In fact before 
this time no such use of the term can be found. Apart from its earlier and persisting 
canon-law usage to name a species of “exclaustration”, from the 1650s to the early 
1800s the central use of secularization was in public law and diplomacy to refer to the 
                                                
29  Here I am much indebted to the brilliant discussion of these issues in M. Heckel, 
“Säkularisierung: Staatskirchenrechtliche Aspekte einer umstrittenen Kategorie,” in K. 
Schlaich ed., Martin Heckel Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, vol. 2 
(Tübingen, 1989), 773-911, 800-62 in particular. 
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transfer of ecclesiastical properties and territories to civil ownership or control.30 It is 
of course possible that an epochal self-assertion of human rational autonomy was 
taking place at this time, even if the term secularization was not used to name it. As 
we shall see, however, the relevant historical research shows no evidence of a 
relegation of divine worship in favor of rational autonomy in early modern Europe, 
and a great deal of evidence to the contrary. 
We can deal with the usage of the term secularization during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries fairly briskly. The first recorded use of the public-law term 
secularization (saecularisazio, Säkularisierung), to name the civil conversion of 
ecclesiastical property and jurisdiction, took place in 1646. This was in the course of 
the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Münster that formed part of the Peace of 
Westphalia (1648).31 Here it was used by the French ambassador, without any fanfare, 
to refer to the transfer of ecclesiastical properties and territories — churches, 
monasteries, bishoprics, cities — to civil jurisdiction and control. The term 
secularization would thence be applied to both the expropriation of such properties 
and territories by Protestant princes during the Thirty Years War, and also to their 
transfer to civil control as part of the reparations required by the peace settlement. 
This latter transfer took place in accordance with the terms of so-called Normaljahr 
(standard year) of 1624. In 1648 the conflicting Protestant and Catholic parties had 
agreed to accept the distribution of church properties and populations that had 
nominally obtained in 1624 as the status quo ante, to be re-established as the 
condition of peace.32 This measure is thus typical of the context of public law and 
diplomacy that defined the usage of secularization at that time.33 
                                                
30  Strätz and Zabel, “Säkularisation, Säkularisierung”, 792-809. For the canon-law 
useage of secularisation to name a species of exclaustration — the permanent transfer of 
cloistered clergy to “worldly” parochial duties — see John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, and 
Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of Canon Law (Mahwah NJ., 2000), 
851-73; and Madeleine Ruessmann, Exclaustration: Its Nature and Use According to Current 
Law (Rome, 1995), 15-85. 
31  Strätz and Zabel, “Säkularisation, Säkularisierung”, 798-99. Martin Heckel, 
‘Säkularisierung: Staatskirchenrechtliche Aspekte einer umstrittenen Kategorie’, in K. 
Schlaich (ed.), Martin Heckel Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, vol. 2 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989), pp. 773-911, at p. 773.  
32  Ralf-Peter Fuchs, Ein “Medium zum Frieden”: Die Normaljahresregel und die 
Beendigung des Dreißighährigen Krieges (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010).  
33  Lexicographers were already treating this usage as standard by the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, as we can see from this entry in an authoritative lexicon from the period: 
‘Secularisation [Secularisation] is an action whereby a religious person or a religious place is 
made worldly [weltlich, secular], and whose income is applied to worldly things. As occurred 
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This context stretched back to the Religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555, which 
was the public-law treaty that radically restructured the religious constitution of the 
German Empire, and the public-law usage of secularization stretched forward to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.34 Indeed, one might say that secularization in this 
sense and form reached its peak in 1803. At this point, reeling under the Napoleonic 
conquest of Germany, the imperial government enacted a self-dissolving 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (Final Recess of the Reich’s Deputation) that 
secularized all of the empire’s remaining ecclesiastical territories and cities by 
transferring them to civil princes, as partial compensation for the French occupation 
of the Rhineland.35 Under the tutelage of Napoleon’s Grande Armée, the leading 
territorial state of Prussia would enact a similarly radical secularization in 1806, 
resulting in major loss of territory and property for the Catholic church in particular. 
Once again, even at this late stage, secularization referred not to an epochal process 
that was supplanting faith in the divine with the autonomy of human reason, but to the 
transfer of ecclesiastical territories and jurisdictions to civil control; although at this 
point the context for the philosophical-historical understanding of secularization was 
indeed forming, as we shall see below. 
It might appear that something resembling the philosophical-historical 
conception of secularization can be found in the sphere of early modern biblical 
criticism and ecclesiastical history. The most obvious candidate is Spinoza’s 
ecclesiastical history, where humanity is depicted as outgrowing the immature 
biblical stories that had been accommodated to its intellectual infancy by the 
imagination of the prophets, thence to enter into rational maturity through the 
                                                                                                                                      
with the archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen in the Westphalian Peace’. Johann Hübner, 
(ed.), Realen Staats- , Zeitungs- und Conversations-Lexicons (Leipzig, 1711), p. 1366. The 
entry remains unchanged in the 1737 revised edition. 
34  See, for example, the characteristic explication of the term by Christian Weisse in 
1793: 
When the word secularisation is used in its original general sense, one 
understands it to mean any conversion of ecclesiastical goods into secular 
[weltliche], regardless of the manner in which this is effected. If one uses this 
expression in its customary narrower sense, though, then one restricts it to the 
conversion of ecclesiastical property carried out by the supreme political 
authority. 
Christian Ernst Weisse, Ueber die Sekularisation Deutscher geistlicher Reichsländer in 
Rücksicht auf Geschichte und Staatsrecht (Leipzig, 1793), p. 3. 
35  Klaus Dieter Hömig, Der Reichsdeputationshauptschluss vom 25. Februar 1803 und 
seine Bedeutung für Staat und Kirche (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1969).  
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disclosure of Spinoza’s own metaphysics of a self-unfolding ur-substance.36 But 
Spinoza never used the term “secularization” to characterize this imaginal process of 
intellectual maturation.37 Further, it seems that during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries he was not received as a “secular” thinker but as a heterodox — pantheist, 
atheist or Cabbalistic — philosophical theologian or ‘theosopher’.38 
                                                
36  Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, trans. S. Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 
1989), pp. 73-87. For the view of Spinoza as an atheist rationalist materialist, see Jonathan I 
Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670-
1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 43-51. For a contrary view — of Spinoza 
as a fundamentally theological thinker whose central concern was with the human pursuit of 
beatitude or blessedness — see Brad S. Gregory, ‘Introduction’, in B. S. Gregory (ed.), 
Benedict de Spinoza: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Leiden: Brill, 1989), pp. 1-44, at pp. 
10-18. 
37  It seems that the term ‘secularisation’ does not appear in any of Spinoza’s Latin texts 
or their English translations. Even more surprising is the likelihood that he did not use the 
adjective ‘secular’ either. Neither term is listed in the Lexicon Spinozanum. ‘Secular’ does not 
appear in the Latin text of the Tractatus Theologico-Philosophicus, and seems to be an 
interpolation introduced by Robert Elwes’s English translation in the 1880s. Elwes translates 
Spinoza’s jus principatus — the right of rule/imperium — with the phrase ‘the rights of 
secular rulers’. See and compare, Benedict de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, vol. 3 
of Benedict de Spinoza: Opera (Hamburg, 1670), p. 223; and Benedict de Spinoza, A 
Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: 
Dover 1883/1951), p. 238. Despite departing from Elwes in various regards, Samuel Shirley 
follows him in translating jus principatum as the ‘right of secular rule’. See Benedict de 
Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, trans. S. Shirley (Leiden: Brill, 1989), p. 273. Even 
though it is a dubious interpolation — probably related to a secularist reception context — it 
might be possible to defend Elwes’s introduction of the term ‘secular’ on the grounds that it 
captures Spinoza’s persistent defence of the supreme power of the state against its priestly 
usurpation. Be that as it may, this usage has no relation to ‘secular’ as signifying a rational 
humanist outlook, and it seems that Spinoza never used the verb ‘secularise’ or its substantive 
form ‘secularisation’. 
38  One of the best collection of reception studies in this regard remains Karlfried 
Gründer and Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, (eds.), Spinoza in der Frühzeit seiner religiösen 
Wirkung (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1984). See in particular the exemplary 
paper by Walter Sparn that traces the reception of Spinoza within Lutheran theology across 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where the crucial problem was how to deal with 
Spinoza’s metaphysics understood as a monistic theosophy that threatened the dualistic 
metaphysics required by Lutheran Christology: Walter Sparn, ‘Formalis Atheus? Die Krise 
der protestantischen Orthodoxie, gespiegelt in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit Spinoza’, in 
Gründer and Schmidt-Biggemann (eds.), Spinoza, pp. 27-64. See also Petry’s paper in the 
same volume that traces the overlapping reception of Spinoza’s theosophy and Böhme’s more 
mystical version in a variety of sectarian and confessional circles in the late seventeenth-
century Netherlands and England. Once again the focus is on the challenge posed to Christian 
dualism by Spinoza’s metaphysical monism and its use to harmonise religion, philosophy and 
the sciences. Petry concludes that confessional Christian metaphysics was not seriously 
challenged by Spinozism, whose monism was also attacked from a different anti-rationalist 
direction by Bayle. Michael John Petry, ‘Behmenism and Spinozism in the Religious Culture 
of the Netherlands, 1660-1730’, in Gründer and Schmidt-Biggemann (eds.), Spinoza, pp. 111-
48. For the early eighteenth-century reception of Spinoza as a heretical Christian Cabbalist, 
see M. Mulsow, “A German Spinozistic Reader of Cudworth, Bull, and Spencer: Johann 
 14 
There seems to be no evidence, then, to suggest that prior to 1800 the term 
secularization was ever extended beyond its public-law sense of the civil conversion 
of ecclesiastical things. What about the possibility that the modern philosophical-
historical meaning of the term — as the supplanting of divine worship with human 
reason — was nonetheless anticipated by a real historical process of this kind taking 
place in early modernity? Once again we need to shift the burden of proof. Let those 
who claim this adduce the relevant evidence. In fact the most relevant body of 
scholarship — that dealing with processes of confessionalization in early modern 
Europe — points in the reverse direction. A large field of research crossing various 
historical subdisciplines — social, political, pedagogical, intellectual, and religious 
history — points to the conclusion that the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were 
characterized not by a diminution in divine worship but by its radical expansion and 
intensification.39 This is because the successive waves of Lutheran, Calvinist, and 
Catholic confessionalization that swept across central and northern Europe during this 
period deployed pastoral and pedagogical institutions that were designed to bring 
whole populations within the circumference of spiritual guidance and pious life-
styles.40 
These confessionalizing movements were both religious and political, both top-
down and bottom-up.41 They combined the recondite tightening of theological 
                                                                                                                                      
Georg Wachter and his Theologia Martyrum (1712),” in C. R. Ligota and J.-L. Quantin eds., 
History of Scholarship (Oxford, 2006), 357-83.  
39  For a useful overview, see Heinz Schilling, ‘Confessional Europe’, in T. A. J. Brady, 
H. A. Oberman, and J. D. Tracy (eds.), Handbook of European History 1400-1600: Latin 
Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation. Volume II: Visions, Programs and Outcomes 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 641-82. Succinct surveys of the impact of confessionalisation 
within the German empire are provided in Heinz Schilling, ‘Die Konfessionalisierung im 
Reich: Religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620’, 
Historische Zeitschrift 246 (1988), 1-45; and Wolfgang Reinhard, ‘Zwang zur 
Konfessionalisierung? Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters’, 
Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung 10 (1983), 257-77.  
40  For the impact of confessionalisation at the level of the formation and differentiation 
of religious communities, see Hans-Christoph Rublack, ‘New Patterns of Christian Life’, in 
Brady, Oberman, and Tracy (eds.), Handbook of European History 1400-1600 Volume II, pp. 
585-606; and Heinz Schilling, ‘Confessionalisation and the Rise of Religious and Cultural 
Frontiers in Early Modern Europe’, in E. Andor and I. G. Tóth (eds.), Frontiers of Faith: 
Religious Exchange and the Constitution of Religious Identities 1400-1750 (Budapest: 
European Science Foundation, 2001), pp. 21-35. 
41  For a powerful critique of an earlier scholarship that alleged the hijacking of an 
initially popular Reformation by clerical and political elites, see Berndt Hamm, ‘Reformation 
"von unten" und Reformation "von oben": Zur Problematik reformationshistorischer 
Klassifizierungen’, in H. R. Guggisberg and G. G. Krodel (eds.), The Reformation in 
Germany and Europe: Interpretations and Issues (Special Volume, Archive for Reformation 
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doctrine with intense forms of popular devotion and worship.42 Confessionalization 
was grounded in the building of mutually opposed confessional pastoral and 
pedagogical institutions — parochial schools for the catechizing of the people, an 
explosion of new universities for the training of priests and theologians — that were 
designed to make formerly elite spiritual practices available to whole religious 
communities.43 It was also supported by increasingly centralized confessionalized 
legal systems in which adherence to specific articles of faith was policed by heresy 
prosecutions and transformed into a condition of office-holding in the confessional 
state.44 From sixteenth-century Scandinavia, Holland, Saxony, and Bavaria to late 
seventeenth-century France and England, and with very few exceptions — 
Brandenburg-Prussia being one — European ecclesiastical history was characterized 
not by the removal religion from public life but by its political and juridical 
consolidation, in the form of the confessional state.45 In short, there is every historical 
reason to think that rather than a diminution of Christian worship and a rise of 
rationalist humanism, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a significant 
intensification of Christian piety in increasingly confessionalized states and societies. 
                                                                                                                                      
History/Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte)  (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1993), pp. 
256-93. Hamm shows that reform movements were informed by the actions of elite 
theologians and urban and territorial governments from the very beginning, and that their 
actions were in no way opposed to popular and communal agitation. 
42  See the account of the emergence of an intensely adorational Christology within the 
context of Lutheran confessionalisation — combining prayer, hymnal, painting, liturgy, and 
theology — in Jörg Baur, ‘Lutherische Christologie’, in H.-C. Rublack (ed.), Die lutherische 
Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland  (Gütersloh: Gern Mohn, 1992), pp. 83-124. For an 
important collection of studies dealing with the explosion of practices of piety during the 
confessional period, see Hans-Jörg Nieden and Marcel Nieden, (eds.), Praxis Pietatis: 
Bieträge zu Theologie und Frömmigkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1999).  
43  Anton Schindling, ‘Schulen und Universitäten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Zehn 
Thesen zu Bildungsexpansion, Laienbildung und Konfessionalisierung nach Reformation’, in 
W. Brandmüller, H. Immenkötter, and E. Iserloh (eds.), Ecclesia Militans. Studia zur 
Konzilien- und Reformationsgeschichte Remigius Bäumer zum 70. Geburtstag gewidmet 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1988), pp. 561-70. John W. Padberg (SJ), ‘Development 
of the Ratio Studiorum’, in V. J. Duminuco (SJ) (ed.), The Jesuit Ratio Studiorum: 400th 
Anniversary Perspectives (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000), pp. 80-100.  
44  On the tight nexus of law and religion in the Saxon confessional state, see Günter 
Jerouschek, Wolfgang Schild, and Walter Gropp, (eds.), Benedict Carpzov: Neue 
Perspektiven zu einem umstrittenen sächsischen Juristen (Tübingen: Diskord, 2000). On early 
modern England as a confessional state founded in the alliance between Anglicanism and the 
common law, see Clark, English Society.  
45  For the (entirely contingent) circumstances surrounding the failure of the 
Hohenzollern’s to achieve the Calvinisation of Brandenburg-Prussia, and hence its emergence 
as a “tolerant” multi-confessional state during the seventeenth century, see the unsurpassed 
study by B. Nischan, Prince, People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in 
Brandenburg (Philadelphia, 1994).  
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Let us suggest then that if prior to 1800 the term secularization was restricted to its 
public-law usage, and was not used to name a general process of de-Christianization 
or rationalization, that was because there was no such process for it to name. 
“Secular” in Early Modern Germany (c1550-c1800) 
Turning to the adjectival term “secular”, we can begin by observing that it would 
seem to have had greater currency and significance in early modern Germany than the 
more technical substantive “secularization”. Secular (säkular, weltlich), was a 
Roman-Latin coinage that had long been used in theological discourses to 
contradistinguish temporal or worldly things from religious or spiritual (sacrum, 
geistlich) ones. From the middle of the sixteenth century, however, this semantic 
pairing was transformed in a distinctive manner, through the novel identification of 
secular with “political” and “civil”, providing a new contrast-class for the terms 
“spiritual” and “religious”. The context for this new usage was in fact the rise of the 
mutually opposed confessional communities just discussed, and the ensuing period of 
protracted religious civil war in the German empire and elsewhere in Europe. It is no 
accident, then, that the central locus for the new equation of the secular or temporal 
with the political or civil was to be found in juridical and political discourses focused 
on the problems of pacifying warring confessional states and governing multi-
confessional societies. 
Crucially for our present concerns, there is no evidence to suggest that this new 
usage of the term secular was grounded in an epochal secularization or rationalization 
of the “European mind”, whether envisaged as a breakthrough to free reasoning, the 
transcendental recovery of rational autonomy, or the sublimation of bad theology into 
political instrumentalism. Rather, it appears to arisen from cultural and political 
circumstances of an altogether different kind: namely, from an improvised 
reconfiguration of the institutions and discourses of imperial public law designed to 
provide conditions of political co-existence for two opposed confessional blocs within 
the German empire. Following the unprecedented fracturing of the imperial religion 
at the beginning of the century, and the onset of the first wars of religion, this 
reconfiguration found its first consolidated form in the Religious Peace of Augsburg 
of 1555.46 
                                                
46  Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume I: Maximilian I to 
the Peace of Westphalia, 1490-1648 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 255-336. 
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Two features of the Augsburg settlement are of particular importance for our 
present concerns. On the one hand, the settlement was grounded in a complex set of 
measures for re-arranging the institutions of imperial law and government — the 
Reichskammergericht (Imperial Chamber Court), Reichstag (estate parliament). and 
(from 1559) the Reichshofrat (Imperial Aulic Court) — in order to admit parity of 
legal and political treatment for the two confessional blocs, the Corpus 
Evangelicorum and Corpus Catholicorum.47 Taken together, these measures — for 
establishing parity of legal treatment and access to offices, suspending theological 
truth as a condition for treaty agreement, substituting civil peace for justice as the 
objective of negotiations — amounted to installing a purely political or civil modus 
vivendi at the centre of the settlement. This opened the space in which the peace 
would come to be understood as secular or worldly in the sense of political or civil. 
On the other hand, this momentous cultural and political change was grounded not in 
the philosophies of master thinkers — Augsburg had no Hobbes or Aquinas, no 
Spinoza or Kant — but in the piecemeal juridical and political improvisations of 
hundreds of nameless jurists, statesmen, diplomats whose concern was not to advance 
a secular rationalism but to defend the confessional estate to which they belonged and 
ensure the survival of their own particular religion.48 
The civil peace from which a new conception of the secular would emerge was 
thus neither founded in nor the foundation for a general secularization or 
rationalization of the mind that would sweep through the entirety of culture and 
society. Rather, it represented the improvisation of a confessionally neutral and 
relativistic juridical framework whose role was not to secularize or rationalize 
religion but to maintain a plurality of revealed confessional religions in perpetuity. 
This bifurcated structure — a secular and relativistic juridical framework supporting a 
plurality of revealed public confessions — represented the fundamental form of the 
                                                
47  For detailed discussions of these measures, see Martin Heckel, ‘Parität (I)’, in K. 
Schlaich (ed.), Martin Heckel, Gesammelte Schriften: Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, vol. 1 
(Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1989),  106-226; and Martin Heckel, ‘Itio in partes: Zur 
Religionsverfassung des Heiligen Römischen Reiches Deutscher Nation’, in Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 2, 636-736.  
48  See, M. Heckel, “Das Säkularisierungsproblem in der Entwicklung des deutschen 
Staatskirchenrechts,” in G. Dilcher and I. Staff eds., Christentum und modernes Recht. 
Beiträge zum Problem der Säkularisation (Frankfurt Main, 1984), 35-95, at 50-55.  
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German religious settlement and would find serial constitutional iterations at both the 
imperial and territorial state levels.49 
The Peace of Augsburg was a momentous development. It represented the first 
emergence of a religious constitution that was “secular” in the sense of constituting a 
juridical framework in which the two confessions were viewed neutrally and 
relativistically — that is, as civil bodies independently of their theological truth-
claims — as the condition of ensuring their political coexistence and thence the 
survival of the empire. To the best of my knowledge, the term “secular” was not 
initially used to characterize the new juridical and political framework, but the terms 
that were used to distinguish it — as “temporal” and “political” — marked out the 
semantic space in which a new usage of secular would appear. In a text that he 
published pseudonymously in 1586, Andreas Erstenberger, Catholic secretary to the 
biconfessional Reichshofrat — charged with administering the Augsburg treaty, but 
in fact its covert opponent — drew a sharp distinction between “inner peace” and 
what he called variously “outer”, “temporal”, or “political” peace. Inner peace, 
Erstenberger argued, comes only from our reconciliation with God through the true 
worship of him, which is impossible if we tolerate among us those who worship God 
through alien sacraments, and approach him through false theology and prayer.50 In 
attempting to establish a merely “outer”, “temporal” or “political” peace through the 
legal recognition of a plurality of religions, the treaty of Augsburg was thus both 
impossible and illegitimate, since outer peace depends upon inner peace, and it is the 
role of “worldly” (weltlich, secular) authority to maintain the “unity of the true 
Catholic church and faith” on which inner peace depends.51 
Although it was repugnant to him, Erstenberger had indeed identified the space 
in which a new conception of the secular would appear: namely, the space of a purely 
temporal or political exercise of government in order to maintain a merely “outer” or 
civil peace through the legal recognition of a plurality of public religions. There was, 
however, no direct philosophical or historical path to this secular political order. In 
fact, in a prime instance of history as a domain of unintended consequences and 
                                                
49  Martin Heckel, ‘Zur Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts von der 
Reformation bis zur Schwelle der Weimarer Verfassung’, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1,  366-
401.  
50  Andreas Erstenberger, De Autonomia, das ist, von Freystellung mehrelay Religion 
und Glauben (Munich: 1586), bk II,  183-88.  
51  Erstenberger, De Autonomia, bk II,  189-95. 
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uncontrollable outcomes, the initial effect of the Augsburg arrangements was to 
intensify confessionalization and religious division within the empire.52 Augsburg had 
recognized two religions and established a political or secular religious constitution, 
but only at the level of the empire itself and only for corporate religious estates. 
Below the imperial level, within the territorial states, cities, and ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions, it permitted authorities to impose a particular religious confession by 
law, in accordance with the slogan cuius regio eius religio (whose the country, theirs 
the religion). In doing so, in the century from 1550 to 1650, Augsburg materially 
helped the formation of an array of religiously disciplined, internally intolerant, and 
mutually hostile confessional states within the empire, all operating under the 
umbrella of the biconfessional political (secular) imperial constitution.53 
In terminating this unstable and incendiary state of affairs — which had helped 
to catapult the empire into the Thirty Years War of 1618-48 — the Westphalian 
treaties mandated the legal recognition of the three official confessions of 
Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Calvinism within the empire’s territorial states.54 
These treaties thereby signaled the beginning of the protracted dissolution of the cuius 
regio principle and the quasi-theocratic order of confessional states. They did so by 
installing the double-sided religious constitution — the secular juridical framework 
containing a plurality of confessional religions — inside the territorial states, although 
this too was a protracted and uneven business.55 
We can see the terminological results of these momentous historical 
transformations in the way that the political jurist Christian Thomasius characterized 
the rights of the civil sovereign in religious affairs towards the end of the seventeenth 
century. Writing on the other side of the Thirty Years War, and in Brandenburg-
Prussia — whose failure to confessionalize made it the first territorial state to install 
the pluralistic religious constitution — Thomasius could fill-in the space of the 
secular whose opening had horrified Erstenberger a hundred years earlier. In a 
textbook intended to introduce students to the discipline of public church law 
(Staatskirchenrecht), Thomasius was thus able to specify the prince’s religious rights 
                                                
52  Martin Heckel, Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1983), pp. 33-66. 
53  See, Schilling, ‘Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich’; and Reinhard, ‘Zwang zur 
Konfessionalisierung?’. 
54  Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire: Volume I, pp. 619-31. 
55  Heckel, Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter, pp. 181-209. 
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by distinguishing between two forms of authority. On the one hand, there was the 
religious authority of the churches that was geistlich or spiritual in the sense of being 
exercised for man’s eternal salvation without any access to coercive civil power. On 
the other hand, there was the civil sovereignty of the state that was secular (weltlich), 
civil (zivil), or political (politisch) — Thomasius used these terms as synonyms and as 
antonyms to geistlich — in the sense of exercising an undivided and supreme 
authority over a territory for the sole purpose of maintaining civil peace and 
flourishing.56 
Rather than grounding his conception of the political in a universalistic rational 
(philosophical) conception of the secular, Thomasius did something quite different: 
he grounded a delimited conception of the secular in the specific conception of the 
political that had emerged within the discourse and institutions of German public law. 
In the context of constitutional church law, secular government was not understood as 
grounded in a general accession of human rational autonomy that was sweeping all 
before it. Rather, it was a form of government whose political character was 
distinguished from spiritual authority only as the result of a specific historical 
grounding: namely, its grounding in a religious settlement that required the state to 
supervise a plurality of religious confessions, purely to maintain the political peace 
between them, hence without endorsing any of their truths or attempting to impose a 
secular truth on them. 
Far from being a “secular liberal” who grounded religious toleration in the rights 
and freedoms of rational individuals, Thomasius thus insisted that toleration was a 
right that belonged to the prince alone, and that it was grounded in his use of it to 
pacify mutually intolerant confessions and maintain religious pluralism.57 Similarly, 
like the other early modern German political jurists, Thomasius did not think that 
religions themselves could be rationalized or secularized in a philosophical or deistic 
manner, thence to form a continuum with a secularized political and juridical order — 
                                                
56  Christian Thomasius, Höchstnöthige Cautelen Welche ein Studiosus iuris, der sich 
zur Erlernung der Kirchen-Rechts-Gelahrheit auff eine kluge und geschickte Weise 
vorbereiten will, zu beobachten hat (Halle, 1713), ch. 17, §§1-12.  
57  Ian Hunter, ‘The Tolerationist Programmes of Thomasius and Locke’, in J. Parkin 
and T. Stanton (eds.), Natural Law and Toleration in the Early Enlightenment  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 107-37.  
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let alone with a secularized domain of natural sciences.58 He insisted instead that 
religion was a matter of revelation, faith, and grace, lying beyond all philosophical 
rationalization or metaphysical explication.59 This was not least because those who 
offered such explications typically did so in order to provide philosophical grounding 
for a “true” religion, thereby threatening religious pluralism and even the neutrality of 
the state, by claiming that it too required such a grounding. 
The secular character of the emerging German religious constitution thus had 
nothing to do with secularization understood as a civilizational shift from divine 
dependence to human autonomy grounded in some epochal self-assertion of 
philosophical rationality. It does not matter whether this autotomizing rationality is 
viewed as grounded in freethinking individuals, the progressive historical refinement 
of man’s capacity for rational self-governance — whether through linear recovery or 
successive dialectical sublimations — or, finally, in the delusive sublimation of 
Protestant religiosity into an alienated subjectivity and disenchanted world. Nobody 
thought about secularization or the secular in these philosophical-historical ways 
between the 1550s and the 1790s. This was in part because these ways of thinking 
and talking were yet to be invented, and in part because the secularity of the religious 
constitution had a quite different form, grounds, and historical consequences. Against 
this backdrop — of a constitution whose secularity consisted in the maintenance of a 
plurality of confessional religions — how did it come about, then, that in the early 
1800s philosophical histories began to emerge in which secularity was supposed to 
consist in the progressive transformation or sublimation of confessional religion into a 
series of rational substitutes?  
The Philosophy and Politics of Secularization in the Early Nineteenth Century 
We must preface our answer to this question with some methodological 
reflections, in order to deal with a remarkable fact about the history of the 
historiography of secularization: namely, that during the twentieth century the 
overwhelming majority of histories presumed that some version of the philosophical 
history of secularization was in fact true, regardless of the evident social persistence 
                                                
58  For a different view, according to which early modern political secularization formed 
part of a general “removal of Christian theology from all aspects of thought”, see Mark 
Somos, Secularisation and the Leiden Circle (Leiden, 2011), 1-47, at 4. 
59  Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and 
the Reform of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 2006).  
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and (in Germany) constitutional entrenchment of confessional religion. In other 
words, depending on the cultural-political program being pursued, it was presumed 
that confessional religion was succumbing to the march of science, being “translated” 
or refined into transcendental rationality, sublimated into secular thought and 
institutions, and so on. Throughout this period, however, the confessional religions 
were continuously adapting to new cultural and political circumstances and — most 
remarkable of all — would turn out to have at least as strong a claim on the future as 
philosophical rationality. 
The historical persistence of confessional religion and the historical contingency 
and tendentiousness of various philosophical rationalisms now sets the scene for a 
revisionist scholarship that is likely to radically transform our understanding of the 
philosophical history of secularization. As we have noted, the most powerful 
philosophical histories of secularization emerged from Protestant rationalists like 
Kant and Hegel, for whom Catholicism was the de facto embodiment of a merely 
historically revealed ritualistic religion destined to be superseded by a philosophical 
faith. It is thus no accident then that this revisionist scholarship has been driven by 
scholars working on the persistence and adaptability of organized Catholicism during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.60 Taking a leaf from their books, we can now 
extend this revisionism to the persistence of Protestant confessional religion, 
especially in the light of our argument that the secularity of the German religious 
constitution was predicated on the permanence (not the supersession) of an array of 
revealed confessional religions. 
It is almost impossible to understand the historical emergence and structure of 
Germany’s secular religious constitution if one approaches it from the perspective of 
philosophical history and the human sciences; that is, if one thinks of it as grounded 
in ideas that are regarded as either autonomous or else as the sublimated form of 
social forces and relations. This is because the constitution was grounded in a series 
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of concrete measures improvised within the institutions of public law — measures for 
ensuruing parity of juridical recognition and political representation for the two 
religious parties, for suspending theological truth-claims in treaty negotiations, for 
concluding purely political forms of peace — as the means of establishing the 
conditions of political coexistence for the two confessional blocs. The secularity that 
these measures induced in political jurists thus did not assume the form of a 
generalized rationalistic or “disenchanted” philosophy or ideology — something that 
might join with the “secularity” of physico-theology or the natural sciences to form a 
secularist “social imaginary”. Rather, it was the domain-specific attitude required to 
treat religions as a plurality of legally recognized civil associations, leaving the jurists 
free to adhere to a particular religion in their Christian personae. 
Its emergence under these historical conditions, as a result of these juridical and 
political measures, accounts for the constitutively ambivalent or Janus-faced character 
of German constitutional secularity. On the one hand, these circumstances had 
produced a juridical-political framework that was secular in the sense of adopting a 
neutral and relativistic view of all theological truth-claims in order to maintain a 
plurality of confessional churches as public law corporations under the supervision of 
a religiously neutral state. On the other hand, the role of this framework was not to 
impose a secular Weltanschauung or civil religion on society, but to permanently 
maintain an array of publicly supported confessional churches each teaching its own 
version of absolute religious truth.61  
What is not sufficiently understood or appreciated is the impact of this emergent 
juridical and political order on academic theology and philosophy. In the course of its 
suspension of theological truth, the subculture of German public law acquired the 
capacity to treat all revealed theological postulates — regarding such things as divine 
intellection and man’s participation in it, the relation between Christ’s divine and 
human natures, his mode of presence in the Eucharistic host, and so on — in a neutral 
and relativistic manner, that is, as the irreconcilable teachings of rival religious 
communities and ways of life. At the same time, however, and for the same reasons, 
the public law subculture adopted a similar view of the transcendental postulates 
                                                
61  For an authoritative discussion of this double-sided character of the German religious 
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113 (2014), 37-62. 
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advanced by various philosophical schools — regarding the dualistic or monistic 
character of “substance”, for example, or the relation between man’s intellect and 
sensibility, or the mind’s relation to the world, and similar. These too would 
eventually be constitutionally protected, as the plural teachings of rival philosophical 
associations and social Weltanschauungen.62 But like the confessional religions these 
“philosophical ideologies” were also viewed as irreconcilably opposed to each other, 
and to be kept at a distance from the institutions of law and politics that had to remain 
neutral between them.63 
For this reason, when a rationalist philosophical theology such as Spinoza’s 
surfaced in seventeenth-century Brandenburg-Prussia, it was not regarded as a 
secularizing threat to a “conservative” religious culture. Rather, it was viewed as a 
quasi-religious threat to the secular juridical-political regime and the plurality of 
revealed religions that it maintained.64 Rationalist philosophies thus were not the 
foundations of Germany’s secular religious order, but schools of thought to be 
maintained within it in the manner analogous to the confessional churches and sects. 
At the same time, they were also capable of threatening this order should they acquire 
the political capacity to breach the relativistic secular framework and impose their 
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Stosch as a heterodox theologian, rather than as a secular philosopher, was a sign that they 
nonetheless (secretly) regarded him as a secular philosopher, even though this is not reflected 
in the transcript of the proceedings! See, Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 641-45. 
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rationality as the “true” foundations of politics and religion. This is what began to 
happen at the turn of the eighteenth century; since in claiming to offer alternative 
schemas for man’s moral regeneration, the rationalist philosophies and philosophical 
histories assumed the status as rivals to the confessional religions — consider Kant’s 
“pure religion of reason” — thereby taking positions within the public religious 
order.65 Yet in also claiming to have uncovered the “true” philosophical-historical 
foundations of the order itself — in the advance of scientific reason, or the refinement 
of revealed religion into transcendental moral philosophy, or the sublimation of 
Christian ideals into a moralized secular state, and so on — the philosophical 
historians sought to exempt themselves from the relativistic and pluralistic religious 
constitution on the sectarian grounds that it was about to be superseded by one of 
their philosophical religions.  
This was the state of historical affairs that developed when Immanuel Kant 
published his Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason in 1793, accompanied by a 
series of essays in which he rejected the Prussian religious constitution and 
challenged its most recent instantiation, the Edict on Religion that had been 
promulgated by Friedrich Wilhelm II in 1788. The edict had two central objectives. 
Firstly, it reaffirmed Brandenburg-Prussia’s public-law recognition of the three 
Westphalian confessions — Lutheranism, Catholicism, and Calvinism — and also the 
status of the four officially tolerated sects: the Mennonites, Bohemian Brethren, 
Herrnhuter (Moravians), and “Jewish nation”. Second, it sought to forestall the 
clerical spread of religious rationalism — which it characterized as Socinian, 
Unitarian, and deistic — by requiring clergy to teach their particular confession’s 
articles of faith (whatever they were) when performing their public office, even if 
their private views differed.66 In both regards the edict was a direct extension of the 
bifurcated religious constitution that had emerged at the Peace of Augsburg, been 
extended by the Westphalian treaties, and developing in Brandenburg-Prussia since 
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the middle of the seventeenth century.67 Yet it was vehemently opposed by religious 
rationalists, including those like Carl Bahrdt who represented the naturalistic 
freethinkers, but also those like Gottfried Hufeland who championed Kantian political 
philosophy and philosophical theology.68 
Kant’s religious and political philosophy was indeed inimical to the edict and the 
Prussian religious constitution, in two key regards: first, in arguing that the official 
confessions with their revealed biblical basis were only empirical condescensions to 
man’s historical immaturity, and were destined to by supplanted by a “pure religion 
of reason” in the form of a self-governing moral philosophy;69 and second in 
declaring that the legitimacy of the state depended on its laws being in accord with 
the self-governing reason of its citizens.70 Kant thus argued that the edict was 
illegitimate because it supposedly sought to forestall the progressive purification of 
confessional religion that was leading to a religion of rational self-governance. Even 
if the empirical people consented to the edict, Kant declared that in principle it was 
morally impossible for them to do so, because such a law would block the historical 
process that was refining their latent capacity for moral and political self-governance 
and thereby superseding the whole order of confessional religions.71 
It is remarkable the degree to which Kant’s own view of this state of affairs has 
informed modern scholarship.72 Yet his view was by no means the prevailing one at 
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the time. For in relying on a quasi-religious metaphysical anthropology — of man as 
a “rational being” whose partial freedom from space, time, and the body permitted 
him to conform his action to pure thought — Kant could himself be regarded as 
proselytizing for a philosophical religion.73 In fact he was regarded in just this way 
not only by the confessional defenders of religious pluralism but also by the Prussian 
ministry of religion, which rebuked him in these terms for the publication of his 
Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason in 1793.74 In this regard, the ministry’s 
admonishment of Kant mirrored the earlier treatment of Stosch, for within the cultural 
and political order of the Prussian religious constitution both figures were indeed 
proselytizing philosophical religionists. How did it come about, then, that a 
philosophical history that projected the progressive erasure of the order of state-
supervised confessional pluralism — the very order that determined what counted as 
a “secular” constitution in public law — should itself come to be regarded not just as 
secular but as a theory of secularisation?  
We have already indicated that the counterfactual character of such theories 
would be exposed by the sheer historical persistence of confessional religions, and by 
the durability of the constitution in which they were legally embedded. In the same 
vein, we have argued that the claimed “truth” of rationalist philosophies and 
philosophical histories could not qualify them to function as effectual foundations for 
the religious and political order. For this order was premised on maintaining its 
independence from all such philosophical truths — truths claiming a grounding in 
transcendental anthropologies, cosmologies, and teleologies — by treating them 
relativistically as the quasi-religious teachings of irreconcilable schools and factions. 
That was how Kant’s philosophical theology was treated in 1793. Yet by the 1830s 
Kant’s philosophical theology had joined an array of highly visible rational theologies 
— freethinking, Hegelian, Feuerbachian, Marxian — from which emerged concepts 
of secularisation that had never been thought before, and philosophical histories of a 
process of secularisation that had never taken place. Moreover, by this time the 
philosophical histories of secularisation were acquiring the political capacity to 
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contest the secular framework of the existing religious constitution. How did this 
come about? 
The Kantian, Hegelian, and Marxian traditions have of course themselves 
deposited their own answers to this question in the archive and the classroom. But 
they have done so by deploying philosophical histories organized around imaginal 
dialectical relations — between “theory” and “practice”, or the “ideal” and the 
“material” dimensions of history — that first emerged in the cultural politics of the 
early nineteenth century. This has resulted in “histories” whereby rationalist 
philosophies are supposed to become politically effectual through “de-
transcendentalizing” processes that realize their ideals — for example, in dialogical 
“speech situations”, democratic discussion contexts, or desublimating social 
movements; while the persistence of confessional religions is treated as a temporary 
stalling of the dialectic that will eventually “translate” them into dialogical rationality 
or social democratic associations.75 Such approaches are radically flawed and 
misleading for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, they traduce the 
constitutional entrenchment of confessional pluralism by treating it as a flawed or 
partial realization of philosophical ideals — of freedom, rationality, democracy, 
sociality — thereby failing to grasp its historical reality as an autarkic order of 
juridical and political arrangements improvised as a means of ensuring the political 
coexistence of warring religions. On the other hand, such approaches disguise their 
own character, since they are not theories of the secularisation of the religious 
constitution — there being no empirical object for such theories — but are in fact 
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cultural-political programs aimed at contesting and undermining the religious order 
by presenting its moral and political deligitimation as an historical process. 
In both of these regards modern philosophical histories of secularisation are, as it 
were, recapitulations of the historical moment in which rationalist philosophies did 
indeed enter the political arena in early nineteenth-century Germany. For in viewing 
the religious settlement from the standpoint of their own “true” philosophical 
anthropologies, cosmologies, and teleologies — as the incomplete manifestation of 
transcendental rationality in empirical history — philosophical histories recapitulate 
the terms in which rationalist philosophies first began to contest the settlement. Since 
empirical historiography shows that the religious constitution emerged as a concrete 
political and juridical order for ensuring the political coexistence of opposed 
theological and philosophical factions, to view it as the incomplete empirical 
manifestation of transcendental reason means to contest it from the standpoint of one 
of the factional philosophical positions that it contains: namely, the position of 
dialectical philosophical history. For modern academic philosophical histories to 
assume this standpoint thus amounts to presuming that rationalist philosophies of the 
Kantian and Hegelian kind already possessed the capacity to intervene in the existing 
juridical and political order, in part on account of their “critical” powers to envisage a 
“theoretical” alternative to this order, and in part because of a dialectical historical 
process that would realize these powers in de-transcendentalized “social” form. 
Given, though, that such a presumption finds no justification in light of the history we 
have outlined — Kantian philosophical theology did not possess a capacity to 
intervene in the Prussian religious order in the 1790s and no process of secularisation 
guaranteed that it would — our task is to provide an historical account of how such 
philosophies acquired a capacity for political contestation and cultural truth during 
the early 1800s. 
In offering a brief outline of such an account — which is intended to supplant 
philosophical-historical models of “theory” and “practice”, the “ideal” and the 
“material” — our strategy will be to approach transcendental philosophies as the 
concrete self-cultures of factional associations, and then to inquire into the political 
mobilization of these elite subcultures within a context of religious and political 
contestation and party rivalry. In discussing how this came about we need to consider 
how an otherwise enclaved series of academic developments in rationalist philosophy 
and theology were given unexpected cultural prominence and political salience 
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through the fracturing of the German religious and political order under the impacts 
of war and revolution. Here we will have three central objects of concern: the 
resurgence of university metaphysics in its Kantian and post-Kantian forms; the 
“psychagogical” role of this metaphysics in forming the charismatic insight and 
authority of the transcendental philosopher; and the role of this figure in the parties 
and sects that proliferated in the political tumult of the Vormärz. Taken together, 
these three factors constituted the context for the appearance of the new 
philosophical-historical conceptions of secularisation. 
The Return of Metaphysics 
Firstly, within the scope of our present concerns, how should we understand the 
resurgence of rationalist or idealist philosophies in Protestant Germany between the 
1790s and 1850s? One way of doing so is by approaching them as recoveries and 
transformations of traditional theocentric and theo-rational Christian metaphysics of 
the kind elaborated by Aquinas and in the Protestant world by Balthasar Meisner and 
Christoph Scheibler.76 Traditional metaphysics had provided a vast intellectual 
architecture organized around the opposition between divine immaterial substance 
and human material being.77 This opposition was mediated by complex conceptions 
of man’s transformative participation in the divine, for example, through human 
participation in divine intellection on the basis of man’s own rational intellectual 
substance. In Kantian philosophy this architecture was projected onto the human 
“subject”. This gave rise to an opposition between the spontaneous intellect and the 
passive sensibility, and to complex figures of the transformation of the person through 
the progressive intellectualization of sensibility; for example, in pure thinking or pure 
willing.78 In Hegelian philosophy the same architecture was projected onto “history”. 
From this arose the Hegelian opposition between the so-called ideal and material 
dimensions of history, and also the complex (Trinitarian) figures of dialectical 
mediation and transformation — Aufhebung, sublimation — through which whole 
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societies or civilizations were supposed to be historically transformed in accordance 
with the self-realization of a “world spirit”.79 
We have already indicated some of the ways in which this metaphysical 
architecture could be placed at the disposal of religious rationalism and philosophical 
history. In Kant’s philosophical history, for example, the merely “empirical” and 
“sensuous” forms of revealed religion — the biblical stories of Christ’s incarnation, 
sacrifice, and vicarious atonement for human sin —are regarded as dropping away to 
reveal an inner human capacity for moral self-regeneration and self-government, for 
which Christ is only the outer symbol.80 Through the work of (the anti-Semitic) Jakob 
Fries (1773-1843) and Albrecht Ritschl (1822-1889), Kant’s rational theology and 
philosophical religion would be a driving force in the development of a “liberal” 
Protestant theology — that is, a theology oriented to man’s own capacity for moral 
regeneration through a redemptive social history — at least until this encountered the 
iceberg of Karl Barth at the beginning of the twentieth century.81 More broadly, 
however, Kant’s conception of philosophical history as the progressive refinement of 
man’s capacity for rational autonomy would continue to play an important role in the 
academic humanities, providing one of the central modern conceptions of 
secularisation, as already noted with regard to Jürgen Habermas. 
Hegel’s discussion of the relation between church and state in his Philosophy of 
Right of 1820 provides us with a more immediately pertinent instance of this German 
metaphysical history. Here Hegel superimposes the dialectical metaphysical 
architecture onto the church-state relation itself. He does so by arguing that in their 
undeveloped historical forms the state serves the narrow material ends of maintaining 
security and peace — thereby cutting itself off from philosophical and scientific truth 
— while the church is the receptacle of spiritual truth, but in the form of an inchoate 
feeling for God, divorced from the rational Idea: “We do indeed know from history 
that there have in the past been periods and conditions of barbarism in which all 
higher spirituality had its seat in the Church, while the state was merely a secular 
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[weltliches] regime of violence, arbitrariness, and passion …”.82 It should be clear 
that here Hegel uses the term weltlich or secular in the same way as Thomasius, that 
is, as a synonym for a specifically political form of government separated from the 
domain of religious truth. In Hegel’s case, however, the metaphysical opposition of 
the “ideal” and the “material” has transformed this separation into a symptom of the 
secular state’s undeveloped, one-sided, and defective form: “A bad state, of course, is 
purely secular and finite, but the rational state is infinite within itself”.83 This is 
because the whole point of Hegel’s “history” of church and state is to project their 
dialectical mediation and eventual reconciliation. 
According to this dialectical process the state loses its secular material character 
as it rationally realizes “the Idea” (of Christian freedom) that had been present in 
religion as feeling. For its part, religion comes to consciousness of the Idea it had 
been harboring as feeling through the process of rationalization that is bringing this 
Idea to self-conscious realization in the state.84 Hegel does not appear to have used 
the substantive “secularisation” (Verweltlichung) to characterize this reciprocal 
process in which confessional religion is rationalized while the state is spiritualized, 
yet within a few years his followers would, as we shall see below. What is 
immediately clear, though, is that this dialectical conception of secularisation was 
inimical to the bifurcated (“barbaric”) structure of the Prussian religious constitution, 
in which a political-juridical framework that was secular in the sense of neutral 
between competing religious truths, constituted a framework for maintaining (not 
rationalizing) a plurality of confessional religions. But then this hostility might well 
be expected, given that Hegel’s dialectics of church and state was grounded in his 
double-sided metaphysical anthropology — of man as a simultaneously spiritual and 
material being — and the overcoming of this duality through successive 
materializations of the world spirit in history. In any case, it should be clear enough 
that the philosophical histories of religion and politics launched by Kant and Hegel 
were not in fact theories of confessional religion and the Prussian religious order.85 
Rather, they were the instruments and effects of a cultural politics designed to contest 
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and displace the secular order of confessional religions on the basis of a rival 
philosophy of subjectivity and history that was itself deeply indebted to Christian 
metaphysical anthropology and cosmology. 
The Authority of the Metaphysician 
We have already shown that no philosophical-historical process of secularisation 
— no Hegelian dialectical mediation of church and state — had ever taken place, and 
nor would it. Not only did the unmediated (non-dialectical) separation of state 
supervision and religious truth sit at the core of the early modern religious 
constitution and its nineteenth-century Prussian inheritor, but this Janus-faced 
structure — a secular and relativistic juridical framework supporting a plurality of 
revealed confessional religions — would remain constitutive of the German religious 
constitution right up to its present (post-1949 form), where it has been repeatedly 
affirmed by the German Constitutional Court.86 Again, the central point here is not to 
falsify Hegel’s history of the relation between church and state but to show that it is 
not actually a history in the empirical sense at all. It must instead be regarded as an 
historical projection of the metaphysics of spiritual and material being that serves 
fundamentally “psychagogical” or self-formative purposes, that is, purposes of 
intellectual or spiritual grooming (Bildung, Seelenführung).87 
In this regard, we can propose that the objective of Hegel’s discourse is not to 
present a form of knowledge based in evidence accessible to anyone with a basic 
historical literacy — as can be seen from his portrayal of the separation of church and 
state as indicative of unreconciled spiritual “barbarism” rather than as the outcome of 
a particular historical settlement. Rather, the central purpose or “ethical telos” of 
Hegel’s dialectical discourse is to shape the philosopher himself as a unique 
personage possessing privileged access to truth through the self-transformative 
reconciliation of his spiritual and material sides: 
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The most immediate knowledge spirit can have of itself when it assumes 
the shape of a human individual is that it is capable of feeling. It does not 
as yet have an object, and the individual simply feels himself determined 
in some particular way. He then tries to distinguish between himself and 
this determinate quality, and sets about creating an internal division 
within himself. Thus, my feelings are split up into an external and internal 
world. … I encounter a contradiction within myself which threatens to 
destroy me. … I survive and seek to overcome [aufzuheben] the 
deficiency … . 88 
Only through this act of inner spiritual self-transformation is the philosopher qualified 
to participate in the larger historical or “national” mediation of the ideal and the real, 
thence to participate in the consciousness in which the Idea or the world spirit 
discloses itself, and thereby to reshape religion and the state in accordance with this 
Idea: 
Self-consciousness, then, is a philosophical concept, which can only 
attain its full determinate character in philosophical discourse. If we take 
this as established, we may further conclude that the determinate national 
consciousness is the nation’s consciousness of its own being. The spirit is 
primarily its own object … . It seeks to create a spiritual world in 
accordance with its own concept … and to produce religion and the state 
in such a way that it will conform to its own concept and be truly itself or 
become its own Idea.89 
Christian metaphysics had long constituted a psychagogical discipline in which 
the few chosen to undertake its arduous spiritual exercises were ascribed privileged 
insight into the transcendent foundations of the temporal world, and sometimes — as 
in the case of the bishop-philosophers — Augustine of Hippo, Ambrose of Milan, 
Cyril of Alexandria — exercised power in this world on that basis.90 This form of 
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spiritual-philosophical authority had persisted in different forms through medieval 
monastic and early modern academic metaphysics.91 As a result of the “subjectivist” 
and “historicist” adaptations of the architecture of metaphysics carried out by Kant 
and Hegel, a variant of this same authority had resurfaced in early nineteenth century 
Germany.92 It did so in the form of the charismatic authority of academic 
metaphysicians who claimed access to a supra-empirical Idea of religion and the state 
on the basis of a split that they induced in themselves — into sensibility and intellect, 
the material and ideal, the “external and internal world” — as part of a spiritual 
exercise in self-overcoming that promised them privileged access to the ideal in the 
real.93 
Like Kant before him, in claiming to see through the Prussian system of state-
supervised confessional pluralism and into the future form of a rationalized religion 
and moralized state, Hegel viewed the existing religious constitution from the 
standpoint of the absolute truth of one of the metaphysical philosophies — his own — 
that the constitution was designed maintain in a condition of relativistic rivalry with 
all the others. In doing so, again like Kant, Hegel used the metaphysical paideia to 
claim a form of charismatic spiritual-philosophical authority that was supposed to 
exceed that of the public law jurists and statesmen. When seen from the perspective 
of a reconciled philosophical consciousness capable of grasping the dialectical Idea of 
church and state, the civil authority of the jurists and statesmen could be deemed to be 
grounded in an undeveloped empirical consciousness suited only to maintaining 
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external security and property; although only an elite engaged in this particular kind 
of spiritual grooming could think such an Idea. 
Such prophetic claims had no immediate political impact so long as the political 
and juridical foundations of the existing religious constitution remained intact. For 
under those conditions the charismatic spiritual authority of the philosophers 
remained largely confined to the domain of universities, lodges, illumination 
societies, and literary journals; just as the parallel authority of the confessional 
theologians and clergy remained confined to the rival churches, even if the Prussian 
constitutional umbrella had itself emerged from a distinctively Protestant polity. Were 
the secular and pluralistic political-juridical regime to be disrupted, however, then it 
might be possible for charismatic philosophical authority to be exercised beyond the 
academic enclave. In fact this would take place through the migration of this authority 
to an emerging domain of political parties, factions, and sects, where it could deliver a 
capacity for charismatic leadership based on privileged access to transcendental truth. 
Political Metaphysicians 
This is what happened as a result of the military, political, and social crisis that 
engulfed Germany at the beginning of the nineteenth century and persisted through to 
the 1848 “revolution” and National Assembly and, beyond that, to the formation of 
the Bismarckian state in 1871. This crisis began when the French revolutionary 
armies overran the Rhineland in 1794, leading to the extensive compensatory 
secularisation of ecclesiastical territories within the empire — under the terms of the 
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (Final Recess of the Reichs Deputation) of 1803 — 
and culminating in Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and dissolution of the German 
Empire in 1806.94 These events created the political circumstances that allowed 
academic philosophies to exit their university enclave-cultures and enter the juridical 
and political arenas. 
This happened initially through their inclusion in the discursive mix that was at 
work adumbrating new national constitutional forms to replace old imperial ones, 
especially in the fluid circumstances leading up to the founding of the Confederation 
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of the Rhine in 1815, which entailed finding a federal constitutional order for the 
increasingly powerful territorial states.95 As political instability increased, however, 
academic philosophies such as Kantianism and Hegelianism began to be directly 
incorporated in the platforms of the political factions and parties that were emerging 
in the lead-up to the National Assembly of 1848. This was the period that witnessed 
the emergence of a slew of republican, liberal- and radical-democratic political 
factions proposing the complete transformation of state and society on the basis of 
inalienable individual rights grounded in a democratically empowered universal 
reason.96 It also saw the formation of various opposed factions seeking to protect the 
Protestant and Catholic religions under the umbrella of monarchical or federalist 
forms of government.97 
This development had been underway throughout the so-called Vormärz but 
would find its showcase in the 1848 Paulskirche National Assembly itself, and the 
welter of controversial commentary on its constitutional deliberations. Charged with 
unifying Germany as a parliamentary democratic state, for our immediate concerns 
the most remarkable feature of the assembly is the fact that so many of its key 
factions were jointly philosophical-theological and political. Without attempting to be 
exhaustive, we can thus observe that the Deutscher Hof was a radical democratic 
faction informed by freethinking rationalism, scientific naturalism, and anti-
clericalism of the Painite and Jacobin kind.98 This mix was personified in the leading 
factional figure of Carl Vogt, a physiologist and zoologist who argued against 
religious education and confessional churches by appealing to a free individual 
scientific rationality. The Donnersberg faction was a leftist breakaway from 
Deutscher Hof, co-founded by the “left-Hegelian” philosopher Arnold Ruge, and 
committed to a more radical form of popular democracy and a program of 
comprehensive de-Christianization. Ruge’s vaunting insistence on the inferiority of 
                                                
95  Michael Stolleis, Public Law in Germany, 1800-1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 
2001), pp. 1-40.  
96  Matthew Levinger, Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian 
Political Culture, 1806-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 191-226. 
97  Clark, “From 1848 to Christian Democracy”. 
98  At this stage the factions were named after the hotels and cafés in which they met, 
although they were in fact the seed-forms of the political parties — the democratic socialist 
(SPD), Marxist-communist, liberal, conservative, and Catholic parties — that would dominate 
the next national assembly, to be held at Weimar in 1919. For an overview of the factions, see 
Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1845-1945 (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), vol. 3, pp. 61-3. 
 38 
Vogt’s “mechanical” materialism to Marx’s “dialectical” kind — with its prophecy of 
a working-class revolution that would desublimate (secularize) the alienated forms of 
social activity — is symptomatic of key feature of this political milieu: namely, the 
degree to which political factions, sects, and parties formed and reformed around rival 
philosophical-historical prophets claiming charismatic insight into the unfolding of 
reason in history.99 
On the “right”, Catholic political theologians such as the canonist Ignaz 
Döllinger found their home in the Café Milani faction, which combined an anti-
republican defence of territorial monarchies with a confessional defence of the rights 
of a national Catholic church.100 While not a delegate to the assembly, the Lutheran 
political metaphysician Friedrich Julius Stahl — co-founder of the anti-liberal, anti-
democratic Prussian Konservative Partei — exercised a similar influence on the 
Christian right to that exercised by the left-Hegelians on the anti-religious left. 
Influenced by Schelling’s philosophical idealism and Savigny’s historical 
jurisprudence, Stahl was a legal philosopher who conducted a running public 
commentary on the assembly, especially with regard to the relations between church 
and state.101 Here he provided a powerful critique of both Vogt’s freethinking 
naturalism and all forms of religious rationalism or “philosophical religion”, arguing 
in favor of a quasi-theocratic constitution that would acknowledge revealed 
Christianity as the foundation of the national spirit and thence the legal and political 
order.102 
These proto-political parties provided the setting in which academic 
philosophical rationalism and philosophical history could enter the political arena. On 
one side of the historical equation, rationalist philosophies provided a grooming for 
leaders capable of galvanizing political factions through their charismatic claims to 
enunciate the “present level of historical consciousness” and to prophesy the future 
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fully rational forms of religion and state. On the other side, the emergent political 
parties and sects seemed to provide the philosopher-politicians with a means of by-
passing the existing constitutional order and achieving the direct political realization 
of their rationalist theory-programs, especially programs of secularisation. 
In 1844 in the journal that he co-edited with Ruge, Marx provided an exemplary 
but entirely symptomatic and fantasmatic expression of this nexus when he imagined 
that Marxism represented the dialectical realization of philosophy in political 
practice: 
As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the 
proletariat finds its spiritual weapon in philosophy. And once the 
lightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people, 
the emancipation of the Germans into men will be accomplished. … The 
emancipation of the German is the emancipation of man. The head of this 
emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot 
realize itself without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and 
the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization 
[Verwirklichung] of philosophy.103 
What this meant in reality was that in the political turbulence of the Vormärz itinerant 
left-Hegelian philosophers could found “proletarian” political sects in which the 
“theory” that philosophy was being realized in history provided the charismatic 
grooming that allowed them to function as sect leaders. 
It was in this context that the earlier purely academic-philosophical 
delegitimations of the existing religious constitution — for its putative blocking of the 
progressive rationalization of religion that would issue in a society of morally self-
governing citizens, a rationally self-conscious state, a philosophically self-conscious 
proletariat, and so on — could flow into the concrete political delegitimation of the 
constitution by parliamentary parties and extra-parliamentary political sects. These 
were the circumstances in which the new philosophical-historical conception of 
secularisation — as the epochal transition from a Christian supernatural ordering of 
society to one based solely on an autonomous human rationality — could emerge in 
the form of an array of rival cultural-political combat concepts. 
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The Emergence of Secularization as a Modern Combat Concept 
The variant philosophical-historical conceptions of secularisation that we 
outlined at the beginning of the paper thus first emerged as combat concepts within 
these competing cultural-political programs. These conceptions began to appear in the 
1830s in the form of a linked array of rival programmatic concepts serving 
factionalized cultural and political interests. In the turbulent social and intellectual 
space created by the military-political suspension of the double-sided German 
religious constitution, the rival philosophical-political factions could propose to 
transcend the constitutional meaning of secular — as the political and juridical 
maintenance of a plurality of revealed confessional religions — and they could 
contrive to relegate the political-juridical meaning of secularisation, as the civil 
conversion of ecclesiastical things in favor of a supposedly more philosophically 
fundamental and historically consequential understanding. This was the context that 
permitted the factions to first use the term “secularisation” to refer to the epochal 
transformation of a Christian into a rational society as projected in their rival 
philosophical histories and embodied in their competing party platforms. 
The merging of philosophical, theological, and political factionalism resulted in 
the radically opposed “secularist” and “anti-secularist” political programs that 
splintered the assembly and its ambient sphere of social debate. It was here that the 
term “secularism” (Säkularismus) came into usage as the name for an ideology 
committed to the de-Christianization of society. If the freethinking naturalists 
understood secularisation to mean the replacement of the Christian social order with 
one based on science and ethics, then the right-Hegelians used the term to refer to a 
reciprocal rationalization of religion and moralization of the state. For their part the 
left-Hegelians mocked the “mechanical materialism” of the freethinkers and 
denounced the “theological” politics of the right-Hegelians while advocating 
secularisation as the radical de-Christianization of society through revolutionary de-
alienation. Against all of this, Catholics intellectuals like Döllinger argued for the 
protection of a true revealed religion under a canopy of federated monarchies, and 
Stahl attacked all forms of religious rationalism while advocating a re-
Christianization of society through a return to the quasi-theocratic forms of the 
confessional state. 
If Hegel himself did not use the German form Verweltlichung (“worldlification”, 
secularisation) to characterize the reciprocal rationalization of religion and 
 41 
spiritualization of the state, then in 1837 the Hegelian ecclesiastical historian Richard 
Rothe did. If not the first, then Rothe’s is certainly among the earliest uses of 
secularisation (Säkularisierung, Verweltlichung) in its modern philosophical-
historical sense to name an epochal process of de-Christianization, with Rothe 
defending the “right-Hegelian” variant in which the rationalization of the church is 
accompanied by the sublimated Christianization of the state. Rothe thus faithfully 
outlined Hegel’s dialectical process in which the church was secularized as its ideal of 
freedom was realized in the state, while the state was thereby desecularized:  
In the same relation by which Christendom brings into existence a 
Christian state — that is, a state that is perfect in and for itself — the 
church becomes superfluous. Because in just such a state the Christian 
life has the only truly appropriate cosmic entity and organ of its historical 
efficacy. The Church is secularized [säcularisirt] in the same proportion 
to which the state is desecularized [ent-säcularisirt] … .104 
In a later work Rothe would declare that with the Reformation “Christian life was 
emancipated from its ecclesiastical form and passed into the secular [weltliche] or 
ethical [form]”.105 Hegel’s student Carl Ludwig Michelet followed the same lexical 
pathway in 1843, declaring that secularisation originated in God’s becoming man, but 
now referred to the realizing of divine man in all areas of social life: 
Law, morality, family, state, art, religion are only the ways in which God 
eternally became and becomes man. The goal of history is this 
secularisation [Verweltlichung] of Christianity, that a writer [Hegel] has 
recently rightly claimed to be the true Christian state, where Christianity 
does not remain a mere religion — although not without being sorely 
tested by Reaction for saying so.106 
It is indicative of the factionalized intellectual context in which the term was 
emerging that Michelet’s usage occurred in a polemical defence of Hegelian 
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philosophy against Schelling’s attack on it, with this being the sole appearance of the 
term in a 400-page book. 
The left-Hegelian philosophical-historical usage of secularisation was emerging 
in the same context and time-frame. In a letter to Ruge written in September 1843 
regarding the foundation of a new critical journal, the Deutsch-Französische 
Jahrbücher, Marx displays the role of the charismatic philosopher-politician in 
formulating and leading a project of revolutionary desublimation or secularisation: 
“In Germany … a reign of stupidity has come upon us … . It is becoming clearer 
every day that independent, thinking people must seek out a new centre. I am 
convinced that our plan [for a new Paris-based journal] would satisfy a real need and 
real needs must be satisfied in reality”. The grounds for this extraordinary self-
certainty lie in Marx’s self-elevating conception that the de-alienating transformation 
of religion and society will announce themselves in and to an individual who has 
come to participate in the world’s coming to consciousness of itself: “The reform of 
consciousness consists only in making the world aware of its own consciousness … . 
Our whole object can only be — as is also the case in Feuerbach’s criticism of 
religion — to bring religious and philosophical questions into the form of human self-
consciousness”.107 It is perhaps not surprising that in the following year, this 
charismatic faction-leader — who could imagine that editing a philosophy journal 
was a way of awakening the self-consciousness of the world — would publish a 
political prophecy in which the desublimating secularisation of religious 
consciousness would take place in and through the realization of a radical democratic 
state: 
But the religious spirit cannot be really secularized [verweltlicht werden], 
because what is it other than the un-secular [unweltliche] form of a 
developmental level of the human spirit? The religious spirit can only be 
actualized in so far as the developmental step of the human spirit whose 
religious expression it is, emerges in and constitutes its secular 
[weltlichen] form. This occurs in the democratic state.108  
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As we have seen, none of these putative processes of secularization had actually 
taken place, or ever would, since they were in fact historical projections of the 
“psychagogical” exercises through which rationalist philosophers cultivated the 
charismatic persona required for leadership roles in an array of academic, political, 
and theological factions. It thus represents a significant misunderstanding of this state 
of affairs to imagine that any of the philosophies were connected to a “progressive” 
politics through the unfolding truth of their concepts or theorizations.109 But it is no 
less fantasmatic to imagine that the sectarian rationalism of the Protestant 
philosophies ensured their political instrumentalization by a bureaucratic state bent on 
an “Erastian” subordination of the churches.110 
What swept the rationalist philosophies into political reality was neither their 
materialization (secularization) in a moral state or social class, nor their 
instrumentalization (secularization) by a secular state bent on their ideological 
imposition, but something else altogether: namely, their capacity to imbue the 
leadership of political sects with the charismatic authority to propose installing their 
particular “theory” of secularization as the constitutional foundation of religion, law, 
and state. For just this reason, however, the rationalist philosophies could be swept 
out of political reality if, for example, political circumstances led to the reinstatement 
of the pluralist religious constitution as the modus vivendi between the rival cultural 
and political factions. This is what happened with the constitution of 1849, which 
terminated the rival programs for the philosophical-historical secularization of 
religion and society by re-establishing the constitutional protection of a plurality of 
confessional religions — a protection that would be extended to the rationalist 
philosophies themselves in the 1919 reiteration of the religious constitution. 
Today 
In 2001, in the course of his acceptance speech for the peace prize awarded by 
the German Publishers and Booksellers Association, Jürgen Habermas addressed the 
theme of secularization. He acknowledged that the original meaning of the term was 
juridical, referring to the transfer of church property to the “secular state”, but that 
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later this meaning underwent an epochal extension: “This meaning came to be 
extended to the emergence of cultural and social modernity as a whole”.111 Habermas 
also acknowledged the role of the secular “liberal” constitution in making it possible 
for ideologically opposed social groups to disagree without resorting to violence. But 
this acknowledgement serves only as a preface to his warning that such a 
constitutional order must remain “open” to new learning experiences in order to face 
the challenges of modernity. Specifically, if it is to respond adequately to the tyranny 
of the market, then this order must remain open to the teachings of its religious 
communities. What this requires, he argued, is a form of secularization that preserves 
the transcendental contents of religion while making it available in a rational form, 
and this is precisely the kind of secularisation offered by Kant’s moral philosophy. 
According to Habermas: 
Kant thus did not wish to allow the categorical imperative to disappear 
into the vortex of enlightened self-interest. He had extended freedom of 
choice into autonomy and thereby provided the first great post-
metaphysical example of a deconstruction of religious truths that was 
simultaneously secularizing and redeeming. In Kant the autonomy of 
divine commands finds an unmistakable echo in the unconditional 
validity of moral duties. With his concept of autonomy he indeed 
destroyed the traditional idea of being a child of God [Vorstellung der 
Gotteskindschaft]. But through his critical adaptation of the contents of 
religion he simultaneously avoided the banal consequences of a simply 
vacuous deflation.112 
Here of course we recognize a repetition of Kant’s original philosophical-historical 
program, according to which for the regime of state-supervised confessional pluralism 
to be legitimate, it must undergo a secularizing (rational purifying) transformation 
that allows confessional religion to be transformed into a self-governing rationality, 
but one that preserves religion’s transcendental outlook.  
How should Habermas’s remarks be viewed in light of the history we have 
outlined? In the first place, we can recall that the public-law meaning of 
secularization (as the civil conversion of ecclesiastical property) was never 
metaphorically extended to cover the epochal emergence of a rationalized “cultural 
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and social modernity”. Rather, the public-law meaning remained in its place even 
though the work of juridical secularization was completed in Germany by 1806. 
Meanwhile, the philosophical-historical sense of secularization (as rational 
modernity) that emerged in the 1830s had quite different sources: namely, in the 
resurgence sectarian metaphysics in the Kantian and Hegelian schools, and in the 
political use of this metaphysics to contest the secular framework of constitutional 
pluralism in the name of a rationalized religion and state. 
Secondly, and more importantly, there is no evidence of any kind that the 
Kantian conception of rational autonomy destroyed the spiritual tutelage of the 
confessional religions — the “traditional idea of being a child of God” — while 
preserving their critical function in the secularized form of Kantian transcendental 
reason. As we have seen, this Kantian conception of secularization emerged only as a 
combat concept for a particular philosophical-political faction, thence to do battle 
with the freethinking and left- and right-Hegelian conceptions in the lead-up to the 
1848 National Assembly and in the constitutional debates that took place there. This 
meant that none of the philosophical-historical conceptions was capable of 
constituting secularization as a generally accessible object of scholarly inquiry; 
accessible, that is, to anyone not already pre-committed to the sectarian metaphysical 
subculture that had made the new conception of secularization — as epochal de-
Christianization — into an object of supra-empirical insight for a particular school of 
thought or cultural-political faction. This helps to explain why, in the event, the rival 
factions at the 1848 assembly were incapable of agreeing on a new religious 
constitution through “democratic deliberation” — since there was no common 
intellectual object “valid” knowledge of which might constitute the basis of 
agreement — hence why, in the short-lived constitution of 1849, the assembly 
reinstated a version of modus vivendi religious constitution whose presupposition was 
that no such agreement is possible. 
In fact, far from representing the triumph of the Kantian conception of 
secularization, the 1848 assembly signaled the failure of all the philosophical-political 
factions to translate any of their rival conceptions into viable political programs of 
secularization. It is not sufficiently well understood that the reinstatement of the 
bifurcated religious constitution in 1849 — followed by its reiteration in the 
constitutions of 1919 and 1949 — progressively undermined the capacity the 
philosophical-historical conceptions of secularization to serve as political programs. 
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The important and telling exception to this trend occurred with the enactment of a 
broadly Marxist secularization policy in the post-war German Democratic Republic, 
under the Soviet-backed leadership of the surviving KPD and SPD.113 This suggests 
that given the right historical circumstances — the military and political dismantling 
of the pluralistic religious constitution — it was indeed possible for the rationalist 
philosophical histories of secularization to become politically effectual, here within 
the context of a Marxist party-state committed to enforcing its version as a state 
ideology. 
In the post-war Federal Republic of Germany, however, it appears that 
philosophical histories of secularization have largely returned to the enclave culture 
of the university humanities academy. This was in part because the post-war 
reinstatment of juridically-managed religious pluralism meant that rationalist 
philosophies were themselves maintained as tolerated “philosophical ideologies” 
analagous to religions, and in part because after the first world war Protestant 
religious rationalism had been confronted by its own historical mortality, in the form 
of Karl Barth’s formidable reinstatement of a theology of revelation, faith, and 
grace.114 Contrary to Habermas’s Kantian prospect of a secularizing transformation of 
revealed confessional religion into a rationalized philosophical form — and contrary 
to certain Catholic views of the religious constitution as an instrument for the 
subordination of confessional religion to a state-enforced Protestant rationalism — in 
Germany today revealed confessional religions remain constitutionally protected and, 
in certain circumstances, it can be illegal for those charged with teaching their 
doctrines to pursue their rationalization. 
We can see this from the Lüdemann case that was heard by the German 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 2008. Gerd Lüdemann was a 
professor of Lutheran theology at the university of Göttingen who, after renouncing 
Christianity during the 1980s — but not his theological post — published a number of 
works in which he treated the main tenets of revealed biblical Christianity in quasi-
Feuerbachian terms, that is, as anthropological “projections” serving psychological 
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needs.115 In upholding the decisions of a series of lower courts — that the university 
had been justified in its decision to remove Lüdemann from his post and relocate him 
in a secular religious studies unit — the Constitutional Court declared that the role of 
academic theology was not to teach about theology in a historical or social-theoretical 
manner. Rather it was to teach a particular confessional theology as revealed truth — 
as part of the training of ministers and priests — granting that there were several such 
truths.116 In this judgment the court reiterated the specific form in which the German 
religious constitution is secular — that is, in maintaining a plurality of revealed 
confessional religions none of whose teachings it endorses — while simultaneously 
delineating the academic enclave in which religious rationalism is now contained. 
This enclave is that of the academic humanities institute in which intellectuals are free 
to pursue speculative rationalizations of religion to the extent that they do not 
effectually contest state-supervised religious pluralism. This is where Habermas’s 
Kantian conception of secularisation is to be found. 
But this is also where we find the Hegelian-Thomist philosophical history of 
secularization — as the sublimation of Protestant rationalism into supremacist 
“Erastian” state — that emerged in the second half of the twentieth century and that 
informs Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age. As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, 
this conception arose in part from a factional movement within Catholic theology that 
sought to replace nineteenth-century (“Gilsonian”) neo-Thomism with a variant 
whose neo-Platonic “transcendental” form allowed it to be synthesized with Hegelian 
philosophical history and secularization theory.117 Here Hegelianism could be 
understood as a “Christian philosophy” capable of doing justice to the successive 
unfolding of God’s self-manifesting presence in the world, thereby rendering explicit 
the character of Hegelianism as “sacred history”.118 But this movement was also 
factional in the more familiar Catholic sectarian sense, as it maintained the Thomist 
conception of modernity, viewing it as the product of a deviant Scotist-Protestant 
“disembedding” of objective goods from the world, leaving a “disenchanted” shell 
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available for political, moral, and scientific instrumentalization.119 In conceiving 
secularization as the sublimated form of Protestant theological rationalism and 
subjectivism — and thereby envisaging a desublimating recovery of a lost 
sacramentalism — the Hegelian-Thomist conception is thus only the latest iteration of 
the combat concepts that first emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and 
that now inform the theory-programs of rival academic factions. 
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